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Cao Cong received his PhD in sociology from Columbia University in 
1997 and has worked at the University of Oregon and the National Uni-
versity of Singapore. He is currently a senior research associate with The 
Levin Institute, State University of New York. Cao is interested in social 
studies of science and technology with a focus on China. His journal pub-
lications have appeared in Science, China Quarterly, Asian Survey, Minerva, 
among others. His current research interests include China's science and 
technology manpower and US-China relations in science and technology. 
The book reviewed here, China’s Scientific Elite, a study of those Chinese 
scientists holding elite membership in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
was his dissertation.  
In his study on China’s scientific elite Cao focuses on the members of 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS, Zhongguo kexue yuan), an institu-
tion combining research with honorific activities, and thus comparable to 
the French Academy of Sciences or the former Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences. As the crème de la crème of Chinese scientists the members of the 
CAS should have much in common with members of comparable institu-
tions of other countries. On the other hand, one would also expect crucial 
differences between the Chinese scientific elite and their counterparts in 
other countries, due to cultural differences and because of the strained 
relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the ‘bour-
geois’ intelligentsia. To find out more about the scientific elite’s stance 
towards the Party, and vice versa, and also about the ways in which sci-
entists are recruited into the CAS, Cao collected a lot of quantitative and 
qualitative data by means of interviews with roughly 80 CAS members, 
mainly from Beijing and Shanghai. He contacted these members mainly 
through a system of snowballing introductions. The interviewed persons 
represent more than ten per cent of living CAS members, and come from 
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practically each academic division. Cao’s interview questions were di-
vided into ten sections, covering a wide range of topics, from social ori-
gin, family and educational background, foreign research experience, 
teaching and management responsibilities, personal connections, the 
influence of mentors, and Party affiliation, to questions about the process 
of election to CAS membership. The results of his interviews are inserted 
into the text in the form of numerous tables. At the end of each of the nine 
chapters he adds a summary and discussion.  
Cao employs two theoretical approaches to evaluate the relationship 
between the personal, social and educational background of a scientist 
and his scientific achievements. One theory, proposed by Robert K. Mer-
ton, sees this relationship as universal, which means that factors like race, 
nationality, religion, social position and personal qualities are irrelevant 
to the quality of scientific contributions. Science thus develops within a 
kind of democratic order. The other approach is that of the relativist or 
constructivist school, which denies that scientific knowledge can be 
evaluated objectively because there are no universal criteria for the 
evaluation of scientific knowledge. Science is, it is said, always subject to 
local environment and influenced by economic and political contexts. In 
his study Cao tries to reconcile these two theories, and demonstrates that 
universal characteristics of scientific elite formation can also be found, at 
least to a certain extent, in the authoritarian society of China. This is be-
cause although cultural influences of motivation, the reception of ideas, 
patterns of facilitation and support of or hostility towards scientific ideas 
are strongly affected by local circumstances, the core character of valid 
and reliable results is independent from the environment. 
The scientific elite as a part of Chinese society and an object of Cao’s 
study has first to be defined. Intellectuals―although normally belonging 
to a kind of elite―do not have a proper status in a communist society. 
They are a ‘stratum’ or ‘element’ working for the leading class without 
occupying their own class position. At the same time intellectuals share a 
common feature with the proletariat as they possess nothing but knowl-
edge. Once vilified as ‘stinking number nine’ during the Cultural Revolu-
tion because of a perceived natural tendency to bourgeois or even reac-
tionary thinking, Chinese intellectuals nowadays have once more re-
gained their position among the top-rated occupations in Chinese society. 
This occupational prestige, however, does not equate to economic status. 
Most scientists (in total around 2 million persons) are occupied in re-
search facilities in eastern China, and also in the provinces of Shaanxi and 
Sichuan. The main research institutions are categorised into the ‘five 
fronts’, namely the CAS, institutions of higher education (universities and 
key institutions for which the government has launched several 
development programs), institutions affiliated with ministries or gov-
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development programs), institutions affiliated with ministries or gov-
ernment bureaus, the military-industrial complex, and finally facilities 
under the jurisdiction of local governments and industrial enterprises. 
The highest institution, the CAS, has currently about 460 active members 
and about 160 retired members. As members of an honorific society they 
possess a reputation similar to members of the National Academy of Sci-
ences in the US and the Royal Society in the UK. The majority come from 
elite universities in Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing and do research in 
mathematics and physics, as well as technological sciences. More than 
400 are older than 60, half of this number even older than 70. Less than 10 
per cent are female.  
In Chapter 2 Cao gives an overview of the Communist Party’s policies 
towards these intellectuals and describes how scientific research and 
education is organised. The CAS was initiated by the government as a 
means of controlling the scientific intellectual elite. Because the govern-
ment was and is the only large funder of research (the National Natural 
Science Foundation was founded in 1986), it is the government, viz. the 
Communist Party, whose guidelines must be followed. Applied research 
has been favoured because of its direct utility for improving living stan-
dards, and military research because of its usefulness for national defence. 
Basic research was only sponsored from the 1980s on (‘one academy, two 
systems’―applied research and basic research), and only for a few ‘key’ 
projects, in which the government invested heavily (863 High-Tech Re-
search and Development Program, 973 Basic Research and Development 
Program). Applied research is still of immense importance, while basic 
research, like elementary physics, high-energy physics, or biochemistry is 
in many ways subject to political interests. Thus, it was only recently, 
under politically more stable conditions, that a scientific community 
emerged that was able to set a research agenda independent from the 
Party’s objectives and liberated from the determinants of a policy oscillat-
ing between shou 守 (restriction) and fang 放 (release). 
The CAS, as explained in Chapter 3, has undergone several develop-
mental phases since its foundation in 1955. Unlike in the West, where 
honorific scientific societies are founded by a group of individuals, in 
China it was the CCP that established this institution in order to gain 
tight control over the world of science. Instead of perpetuating the heri-
tage of the Republican Academia Sinica (Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 
founded in 1928), which left the mainland for Taiwan in 1949, the Com-
munist Party copied the corresponding institutions of the Soviet Union, a 
procedure which diminished the quality of the scientific members. The 
first election process was rather complicated with no clear criteria of how 
to define honorific membership. The tensions between the scholarly elite 
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willing to work for the nation and the Party and the anti-intellectual 
campaigns of the latter impeded the further development of an inde-
pendent academy. Only with the proclamation of the Four Modernisa-
tions in 1978, in which science and technology occupied the fourth place, 
and again after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 did the Party 
loosen its firm grip and grant scientists greater freedom. Since then, in-
ternational norms and values, such as funding, peer review and free re-
search, are gaining more importance. 
Class background was of the greatest importance for a personal career 
during the first decades of the People’s Republic. Members of the intellec-
tual elite were denounced as counter-revolutionaries and sent to labour 
camps during the Cultural Revolution. Cao’s interviews nevertheless 
show (Chapter 4) that a lot of CAS members did not originate from typi-
cal ‘bourgeois’ family backgrounds, but rather came from lower income 
families, in some cases due to the untimely death of a parent. What was 
more important than class background was, instead, the parents’ inclina-
tion to foster their children’s desire for a better education. Although a 
higher number of CAS members came from families whose fathers had 
an occupation in science, engineering, law or business, what mattered 
more was the educational environment into which children were born, 
and not the social status. Concerning the geographical origins of CAS 
members, most came from the prosperous provinces of the east coast, and 
from Beijing, all places where educational opportunities are better than 
elsewhere in China. In addition a very high proportion of members had 
not only been educated at ‘key’ universities in China, but had also spent 
some time abroad, where they had gained university degrees, mainly in 
the United States.  
This study also reveals that a very important factor in the proposing 
and election of scientists as members of the CAS is their relationship to 
their mentors (Chapter 5). In general Cao observed a convergence with 
the Western model, where mentors play the role of teachers for their stu-
dents. But the difference in the Chinese model is that mentors also take 
over the task of transmitting moral values to their wards. One of the 
highest moral values to be transmitted to younger generations is, accord-
ing to Cao, the duty to make China stronger and more prosperous. This 
honourable duty even induced scholars to return to their motherland, 
even though they had to suffer repression during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Another characteristic feature is the traditional Confucian respect for 
the prestige of seniors. This attitude stipulates that students respect their 
teachers and prohibits them from challenging their own professors or to 
surpass their merits by developing independent and unconventional 
scholarship. This may help explain why mainland Chinese scientists have 
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not achieved higher status in the international scholarly community. Chi-
nese scholars also experienced, when compared with their Western coun-
terparts, less mobility. This is due to the danwei (working unit) system, 
causing lifetime commitment once assigned to a job. Students, as ‘appren-
tices’, often stay in the same unit as their mentor and have less intellec-
tual freedom or job mobility. The result is an extremely high rate of what 
Cao calls ‘inbreeding’.  
In Chapter 6 Cao poses the question of the relationship between the 
field of research in which a Chinese scholar excels and membership in the 
CAS, and comes to a surprising conclusion. Whereas one would expect 
that applied, especially military research would provide the most CAS 
members,  in fact the opposite is the case - most originate from the fields 
of basic science and civilian research. One reason why military research-
ers are underrepresented despite the fact that their field is financially 
much better supported is that their research results are not easy to evalu-
ate due to their secret nature. Also interesting is the finding that scientists 
preferred to work on self-selected topics, even if they were assigned to 
one of the national key project. Members of elite institutions had a better 
chance of obtaining CAS membership than persons from less prestigious 
research institutions. Job assignments, geared to the student’s examina-
tion scores, play a prominent role in the selection process, more so than 
talent and research productivity. Thus, unsuccessful are often trapped in 
a vicious circle, one that begins with the institution a scholar is assigned 
to: minor equipment leads to minor results, and the latter to less funding, 
preventing the institution from purchasing better technical equipment. 
Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, when Deng Xiaoping 
invited scholars of science and technology to work again for their coun-
try’s sake, he obliged them to be both red and expert. In Chapter 7 Cao 
therefore looks for an answer to the question of whether today CAS 
members still have to be qualified for both their field and the Party. He 
comes to the conclusion that Party membership is not a sine qua non for 
elite scientists. The Party has displayed a very liberal attitude towards the 
scientific elite, as they are essential to the Four Modernisations. Successful 
scientists were even awarded membership in government institutions like 
the National People’s Congress without being a member of the CCP. 
Some even became members of the Party after achieving elite status, or 
joined one of the democratic parties. Deng’s call for redness has thus been 
put aside for the sake of utilitarianism.  
How the election of elite scientists into the CAS works is the focus of 
Chapter 8. The adoption of objective academic criteria, measured by 
quantity and quality of the research, and the contributions made to the 
country are the main guidelines for election, alongside scholarly disci-
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pline and the age of the candidates. The importance of integrity is such 
that the ubiquitous guanxi 关 系 (social networking) plays a less impor-
tant role than one would expect, although members quite naturally pro-
pose members of affiliated institutions or their own students as candi-
dates. The members likewise do their best to exclude the party-state from 
elections as far as possible.  
In his last chapter Cao gives a summary of his findings as well as an 
overview of the interaction between scientists and the government. CAS 
members have relative freedom in their elections and activities because 
the Party needs them to bolster national growth. Members have partici-
pated in debates within the domain of their expertise, for example the 
Three Gorges dam project, but political participation has not been a fun-
damental prerequisite of the scientific elite, as long as the Party allows 
them to pursue their ‘dominant ideology’, i.e. to do research. Politically 
active scientists, like the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi who was a prominent 
supporter of the 1989 student demonstrators, are exceptions. Besides 
doing research the most important objective for the new elite has been to 
maintain its own status as one of the winners of the economic reforms, a 
stance that has and will certainly make them hesitant to pursue causes 
beyond their profession. 
The surprising result of Cao’s research is that in many fields the scien-
tific elite of China has a great deal in common with their colleagues in 
other, Western, or ‘democratic’ countries. The universalistic theory of a 
generally valid pattern for evaluating a scientist’s achievements thus 
seems to be confirmed, although there are differences on some important 
points. Contemporary scientists in China are not only inferior in research 
quality to their international counterparts or to Chinese researchers 
working abroad but also to their predecessors in China herself. The rea-
son for this is, according to Cao, not political but cultural. Cao isolates 
five cultural ‘modal characteristics’ resistant to institutional change and 
which he sees as obstacles to rationalisation and modernisation, namely – 
in his words - a prevalent ‘cognitive formalism’ of a kind of metaphysical 
pseudo-science, a ‘narrow empiricism’, a ‘dogmatic scientism’ found in 
both Confucianism and Marxism, ‘feudal bureaucratism’ in the political 
culture, and ‘compulsive ritualism’ in the process by which children are 
socialized and educated. Adaption to the international rules of the game 
in science and technology can only be successful within a change of Chi-
nese culture. 
In his study Cao presents a profound analysis of the social stratum of 
China’s scientific elite empirically based on interviews. He incorporates 
comparative approaches towards the scientific elite in the US (as explored 
by Harriet Zuckerman, 1996), and also in Late Imperial and Republican 
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China. He shows which features the scientific elite in China shares with 
its counterpart in the West, especially concerning social origins, educa-
tion, the relationship between mentors and students, and the by and large 
objective election process for the CAS. He also highlights considerable 
differences between American and Chinese scientists, such as the trans-
mission of moral values and the position of students who are always sub-
ordinated to their mentor. This study is essential for a better understand-
ing of the elite upon whom the Communist Party depends for developing 
its Four Modernisations. 
Cao transcends purely comparative socio-scientific research by touch-
ing upon the question of the relevance of China’s scientific elite for soci-
ety and politics. In both domains he seems to have detected grounds for 
criticism of behaviour. As long as the scientific elite is allowed to conduct 
research and is financed to do it, it does not care about politics. This is 
also a universal phenomenon, as can be seen with respect to scientists in 
Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia. Another tacit critique might be ex-
pressed in Cao’s description of the scientific elite’s unwillingness to risk 
their economic and social status won as a result of the politics of Reform 
and Opening by touching upon questions of democratisation (as a fifth 
modernisation). Most astounding are the last few paragraphs of the book 
where Cao tries to find a reason for the mediocre achievements of Chi-
nese science in comparison to international standards. Chinese culture, he 
says, is one reason for this backwardness, with some attitudes being in-
tensified by the autocratic style of the Communists government. How 
should we interpret his somewhat hackneyed argument that ‘the renais-
sance of Chinese science may depend on the change of Chinese culture’? 
Cao does not give a direct answer to the question how to change the cul-
tural behaviour in question―if this is possible at all. The only way to un-
derstand this sentence is that Cao is making, in a rather resigned tone, an 
appeal to China’s scientific elite to adopt international customs in order to 
break into Nobel Prize winning top level science. This can only mean that 
the universal validity of evaluation criteria has also to gain absolute va-
lidity in China, which can only work if China’s scientific elite frees itself 
from any kind of paternalism.  
 
